Voluntarism is a framework to develop ground up governance that seeks to rely only on market forces in ways thematically outlined in this introduction.
A similar lecture by David Friedman that also introduces the concept of polylegal society (where law between individuals may vary).
A more leftist cooperative approach that envisions a gift economy by John Spitzer After the revolution introduces well the concept of circles of trust, which can be incorporated into any market based or natural governance solutions as well.
An open question, as far as I know, in constructive anarchy is regulation. As a specific example should we license drivers and regulate against drunk driving. Natural governance insists that IF such regulation is wanted, it must be its own enforcement silo such that any governance affecting its implementation can be challenged, removed, and corrected. A constructive market anarchist solution might be that driver insurance contracts mandate acceptance of driving regulations in order to get reasonable rates, and social anarchists might insist that drivers accepting insurance and regulation place a sticker on their car indicating so, and pressure those that do not with joining the civil norms that indicate mutual trust is deserved.
An answer without regulation is to simply charge drunk drivers who cause accidents with assault or murder. This may be more cost effective, and not cause significantly more deaths than regulation saves if there are high penalties. Unfortunately, this creates an incentive to avoid being charged with assault, to murder someone you accidentally broke their leg (hitting them with your car while drunk), and dispose of the body.
Friday, September 17, 2010
Thursday, September 16, 2010
From The Rule of Law without the State which is well worth reading in its entirety:
Democracy is unworkable in Africa for several reasons. The first thing that voting does is to divide a population into two groups — a group that rules and a group that is ruled. This is completely at variance with Somali tradition. Second, if democracy is to work, it depends in theory, at least, upon a populace that will vote on issues. But in a kinship society such as Somalia, voting takes place not on the merit of issues but along group lines; one votes according to one's clan affiliation. Since the ethic of kinship requires loyalty to one's fellow clansmen, the winners use the power of government to benefit their own members, which means exploitation of the members of other clans. Consequently when there exists a governmental apparatus with its awesome powers of taxation and police and judicial monopoly, the interests of the clans conflict. Some clan will control that apparatus. To avoid being exploited by other clans, each must attempt to be that controlling clan.which is the most insightful explanation I've seen on why centralizing authority in tribal cultures always seems to result in dictatorships and glib dismissals that they aren't ready for democracy. Democracy simply isn't an absolute ideal, and is only appropriate if it can transcend local ideals/loyalties.
some of the highlights of the Xeer. First, law and, consequently, crime are defined in terms of property rights. The law is compensatory rather than punitive. Because property right requires compensation, rather than punishment, there is no imprisonment, and fines are rare. Such fines as might be imposed seldom exceed the amount of compensation and are not payable to any court or government, but directly to the victim. A fine might be in order when, for example, the killing of a camel was deliberate and premeditated, in which case the victim receives not one but two camels.The link also shows the unique dependencies on family and community the Xeer law uses, which probably make it impractical in our cultures, but could it work?